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June 2003 ABSTRACT 
 
Using cross-country data from a sample of low, middle and high-income countries, the paper provides 
the first empirical test of the empirical relationships between national measures of social capital (civic 
and public), social divergence and social capacity upon various indicators of national environmental 
performance. The results indicate a possible link between public social capital (democracy and 
corruption) and effective national environmental policies and the pivotal effects of economic and 
demographic determinants on national environmental performance. The policy implication is that 
improved national environmental performance may be best achieved by encouraging reductions in 
emissions and input intensities and improving the quality of public administration and democratic 
accountability. 
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  21. Introduction 
 
Increasingly governments recognize the importance of social capital and social 
networks to help achieve social and economic objectives. The appreciation of the 
value of social capital and collective action at a local level (Berkes, 1989; Bowles 
and Gintis 2002; Bromley et al., 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994), leaves a 
number of unanswered questions as to its importance on a national level in 
determining environmental outcomes. For example, to what extent do broad-based 
and national measures of civic social capital and public social capital affect national 
environmental performance? Are social barriers to communication across social 
groups, defined as social divergence, significant in affecting environmental 
performance across countries? Are proxies for poverty and measures of the ability of 
individuals to achieve their human potential, defined as social capacity, important in 
determining overall environmental outcomes at a national level? 
 
Despite their potential significance, until now no paper has addressed all of these 
important policy questions. A key paper by Torras and Boyce (1998) examines 
whether unequal power distributions, as measured by income inequality, literacy and 
civil and political liberties, affect environmental degradation in a modified 
environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) model. They conclude that widening the 
distribution of power within society can positively affect environmental quality. 
Scruggs (1998) has also addressed this issue with income inequality, but found it had 
no significant effect on environmental quality while Barrett and Graddy (2000) 
provide empirical support that civil and political liberties improve environmental 
quality. 
 
Pretty and Ward (2001) provide numerous examples to show how social bonds and 
norms of behavior can manifest themselves in local collective action and groups to 
affect environmental performance, but do not test these relationships at a national 
level. López and Mitra (2000) develop a theoretical model that shows the importance 
of government institutions on environmental outcomes and that the potential exists 
for higher than optimal levels of pollution because of corruption and rent-seeking 
behavior.  Damania (2002) has also developed a theoretical model to show how 
corruption may contribute to environmental degradation while Eriksson and Persson 
  3(2003) have shown theoretically that, in a complete democracy, a more equal income 
distribution favours less pollution.  
 
Despite the large literature, theoretical and empirical, to explain cross-country 
differences in environmental performance our paper is the first to actually test if a 
broad range of social determinants (social capital, social divergence and social 
capacity) have a significant effect on environmental quality. Using a comprehensive 
data set on environmental performance developed at Columbia and Yale 
Universities, we examine the effects of social determinants on six broad-based 
measures of environmental quality. After controlling for differences in income and 
population density, we test whether differences in civic social capital (trust, civic 
behaviour and participation in volunteer activities), public social capital (democracy 
and corruption), social divergence (ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, land inequality 
and religious homogeneity), and social capacity (calorie intake and human capital) 
explain cross-country differences in environmental performance.
1  
 
The empirical approach permits us to assess if social factors influence national 
environmental performance. Given that, hitherto, the effects of social determinants on 
national environmental performance have not been estimated before in such a 
comprehensive way, the paper provides an important first step in our understanding of 
the social-environment connections.  
 
2.  Defining the Society-Environment Relationships 
 
Many definitions and measures exist for social capital, social divergence, social 
capacity and environmental performance or quality. Prior to estimating the cross-
country relationships, we review the concepts, definitions and measures for the 
explanatory variables and environmental performance. 
  
Social Capital, Social Divergence and Social Capacity 
 
Putnam (1993, pp. 35-36) broadly defines social capital as “…the features of social 
organization…that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”, which 
are embodied in networks and civic engagement.
2 Using this definition, social capital 
  4may be measured by such variables as trust, which has been used as a proxy for 
social capital in other contexts (Knack and Keefer 1997), or participation in 
voluntary associations.  
 
A related concept is social divergence, which represents the social barriers to 
communication between individuals and groups (Grafton, Knowles and Owen, 
2002). The greater the social divergence, the lower is the opportunity for collective 
action that may help address environmental concerns. Social divergence may be 
measured by such variables as religious and ethnic diversity and wealth inequality, 
which reflect broad social divisions and potential barriers to the exchange of ideas 
across social groups. 
 
Social capacity is the potential for individuals to achieve their human potential and 
may be measured by a number of commonly used and available development indices. 
For instance, poor health or nutrition status or low levels of education are 
development indices that proxy lower levels of social capacity and may reduce the 




No single set of measures can adequately describe the multifaceted nature of the 
environment. Commonly collected proxies of primary environmental quality include 
such measures as air quality, water quality, use of natural resources and land use 
change. For air and water quality, ambient levels of different pollutants are often 
recorded, as are total levels of emissions for some pollutants. In terms of air quality, 
pollutants whose ambient levels are commonly recorded include sulphur dioxides, 
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide and total suspended 
particulates, among others. Ambient measures of water quality commonly recorded 
include faecal coliform, dissolved oxygen and phosphorous, among others.  
 
Single ambient measures of environmental quality are obtained for a specific site and 
at a particular time, thus they are not necessarily representative of the state of nature 
in a country as a whole. Land use measures include a variety of proxies of natural 
  5resource use such as water withdrawals as a proportion of available water resources, 
changes in land cover or measures of soil erosion. 
 
In addition to primary measures of environmental quality, indirect measures of 
environmental performance also exist. For example, the number of species at risk is 
an indirect measure of environmental quality as it is a function of both the 
classification and the resources spent in wildlife research as well as environmental 
factors, such as habitat degradation. Other indirect measures may include the 
performance of governments or national institutions in committing themselves to 
achieving defined environmental targets or agreements such as the Framework 
Conventions on Climate Change, The Montreal Protocol (on substances that Deplete 




3.  A Model of Social Capital-Environment Relationships  
 
 
Social capital, social divergence and social capacity may interact to affect 
environmental performance in many different ways. These effects are a sub-
component of how human activities influence the state of nature. We posit that the 
main drivers of environmental performance are population (or population density), the 
level of income and a variety of institutional and social determinants. The simplest 
structural model that encompasses this representation is given below, 
 
  Eit =  ∀0 + ∑∀iDit + ∃1pdit + ∃2yit + εit    (1),
  
   
Where Eit is a measure of environmental performance of country i in period t, Dit  
i=1,2,…n are measures of a set of social determinants in country i and period t, pdit is 
population density in country i in period t, yit is per capita GDP in country i period t, 
and εit is an error term assumed to be independently and normally distributed.  
 
To overcome both data availability and a lack of variation in social determinants over 
time, we estimate reduced-form equations of (1) using cross-sectional data from poor, 
middle-income and rich countries. Estimates of (1), combined with diagnostics, 
  6permit us to estimate the overall effects of social capital, social divergence and social 
capacity on environmental performance across countries.  
 
4.  Measuring Social Factors and Environmental Performance 
 
An insufficient number of observations exist for the application of a comprehensive 
general-to-specific modelling approach commencing from a general unrestricted 
model that includes all the potential regressors. Thus, we separately estimate 
coefficients for civic social capital, public social capital, social divergence and social 
capacity. This separate equation approach has the advantage that it enables us to use, 
as much a possible, the available information from the sample.  
 
In each of the estimated equations we control for the population per square kilometre 
for 1998 (POP) and gross domestic product per capita converted to international 
dollars using purchasing parity rates for 1998 (GDPPC). The regressands and 
regressors in each of the reduced-form models are described below under the headings 
environmental performance, social capital (civic and public), social divergence and 




The six measures of national environmental performance come from a new and 
important data set compiled by the Global Leaders of Tomorrow Environment Task 
Force (GLTETF) with the collaboration of the Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network at 
Columbia University. Collectively, the measures provide an indication of national 
environmental quality that is comparable across countries. 
 
The national environmental performance variables used in the study include, one, an 
overall environmental sustainability index (ESI) based on 22 core indicators in 2001; 
two, a measure of the state of environmental systems comprised of air quality, water 
quality and quantity, biodiversity and terrestrial system variables (SYS); three, an air 
quality index (SYSA); four, a water quality index (SYSW); five, urban concentrations 
  7of sulphur dioxide for the period 1990-1996 (SO2), and, six, urban concentrations of 
total suspended particulate matter for the period 1990-1996 (TSP).
4  
 
For the measures ESI, SYS, SYSA and SYSW higher values represent better levels of 
environmental performance while for SO2 and TSP the reverse is true (GLTETF 
2000). Sample correlations between the six measures of environmental performance 
are provided in Table 2. The correlations indicate, as we would expect, collinear 




In cross-country studies, social capital variables are typically obtained from the World 
Values Survey (WVS). The survey asks a variety of questions of a sample of 
individuals in a population so as to quantify their values and ethics for comparative 
purposes across countries (Inglehart et al. 2000). The WVS sample includes 24 
countries for 1981, 45 countries for 1990-1991 and 55 countries for 1995-97.  
 
Three variables are used from the WVS to test for a relationship between aggregate 
measures of social capital and national environmental performance. These regressors 
are from the 1995-97 survey and include the percentage of respondents who agreed 
with the statement that  “most people can be trusted”, after deleting “don’t know” 
responses (TRUST). The second variable (CIVIC) is an index where respondents 
were asked to give a 1 to 10 response where 1 indicated the behaviour was never 
justified and 10 indicated the behaviour was always justified. The five behaviours 
include one, claiming a government benefit to which you are not entitled; two; 
avoiding paying for public transport; three, cheating on taxes if you have the chance; 
four, buying something that you knew was stolen and, five, accepting a bribe in the 
course of one’s duties. In our analysis the reported values of CIVIC were transformed 
such that the raw score was subtracted from 50 so that a value of 45 indicates the 
highest possible level of social capital and a score of 0 indicates the lowest level. A 
third variable (ASSOC) is the sum of the proportion of people who were active 
members in any of the four types of voluntary organizations (church or religious; 
sports or recreation; arts, music or educational organization; and charitable 
organization). 
  8 
Although there is a precedence in the literature (Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and 
Knack, 2001) for using TRUST, CIVIC and ASSOC as proxies for social capital, it is 
important to acknowledge some potential problems with these measures of social 
capital. In particular, the coverage of the World Values Survey differs significantly 
from country to country and the sample in some countries is not representative of the 
population as a whole.  
 
With respect to TRUST, Gleaser et al. (2000) show that peoples’ answers to the trust 
question from the World Values Survey are not correlated with how trusting they are 
of others in economic experiments. However, there is evidence of a positive 
correlation between TRUST with how trustworthy is the individual. Thus it may be 
more appropriate to interpret TRUST as a measure of trustworthiness, rather than how 
trusting individuals are of others. The validity of TRUST as a measure of 
trustworthiness is supported by an experiment conducted by the Reader’s Digest. In 
the test, a number of wallets were “dropped” in various countries around the world to 
see how many would be returned. The proportion of wallets returned may be 
interpreted as a measure of trustworthiness. The correlation between TRUST (from 
the World Values Survey) with the Reader’s Digest trustworthiness measure was 0.67 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). Finally, a potential weakness of the ASSOC variable is 
that it only takes into account the number of associations an individual belongs to, 
rather than taking into account the strength of membership. For example, active 
membership in a volunteer fire brigade is treated as equivalent to occasional church 
attendance. 
 
In addition to civic measures of social capital, public measures are also used in the 
analysis. These variables are described in detail in the International Country Risk 
Guide and were obtained for June 1999 (Sealy, 1999). The two variables used from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) include a six-point scale measure of 
democratic accountability (DEMO) that indicates how responsive a government is to 
its people and a six-point scale measure of corruption (CORRUP) within the political 
system. For the DEMO variable, a higher score indicates more democratic institutions 
and for the CORRUP variable, a higher score indicates lower levels of corruption.  
 
  9Social Divergence 
 
Social divergence, or the social barriers to communication across groups of 
individuals, can be measured in a number of different ways. For this analysis, we use 
three variables, the first of which is the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index (ELF), 
which measures the probability of two randomly selected individuals in a country 
belonging to a different ethnic or linguistic group. The data are only available for 
1960 and are described in Mauro (1995). The second variable is a measure of wealth 
inequality, proxied by a land inequality Gini coefficient (LANDINEQ) scaled from 0 
to 100, obtained from the United Nations Food and Agriculture censuses in the early 
and mid 1980s and is available in Jazairy et al. (1992).
5 The third proxy of social 
divergence is a measure of religious homogeneity that represents the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals have the same religious affiliation (RELHOM) for 





A large number of variables can be used to measure social capacity, or the ability of 
individuals to meet their human potential. The first variable chosen is daily per capita 
calorie supply as a percentage of total requirements (CAL) and is obtained from 
Annex 6 of the GLTETF for the period 1988-1990. This measure is a proxy of the 
ability of individuals to engage in social action to address environmental challenges. 
The second variable used in the analysis is the average years of schooling of the 
population aged 25 years or older (AYS) for the year 2000. AYS is obtained from 




 5. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are presented separately for social capital (civic and public), 
social divergence and social capacity. 
 
Civic Social Capital 
 
  10Table 3 provides the sample correlations for the measures of civic social capital and 
auxiliary regressions. Of the ten possible pairings across the five variables, only 
TRUST and GDPPC have a correlation that exceeds |0.5| and none of the R-squared 
from the auxiliary regressions exceed 0.60, which suggests that multicollinearity is 
not a major problem.  
 
Table 4 gives the ordinary least squares (OLS) results of the regressions of interest.
8 
The results provide little support for the hypothesis that national measures of civic 
social capital have a positive impact on national environmental performance. In the 
SYSW and SO2 models we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
regressors, with the exception of the intercept, are all equal to zero. Further, in the 
SYS equation we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors of 
three alternative model specifications are all equal to zero, which implies possible 
model misspecification. Only in the TSP model is the TRUST coefficient different 
from zero at the ten percent level of significance, but the positive sign on the 
estimated coefficient implies that higher levels of TRUST increase TSP. The CIVIC 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the ten percent level of 
significance in any of the models. The ASSOC coefficient is significantly different 
from zero in the ESI, SYSA and TSP models, but in each case the results imply 
increases in membership of associations reduces the national measures of 
environmental performance. 
 
Public Social Capital 
 
The two measures of public social capital represent risk ratings that assess the 
political stability, responsiveness and effectiveness of governments developed by the 
ICRG system. Table 5 provides the simple correlations and auxiliary regressions for 
the explanatory variables. None of the R-squared for auxiliary regressions exceed 
0.60, which indicates that collinear relationships among the explanatory variables are 
not a major concern. 
  
The results for the models with social capital (public) as the explanatory variables are 
given in Table 6. The results indicate that improvement in DEMO reduces urban 
concentrations of sulphur dioxides and that a reduction in corruption, as measured by 
  11an increase in CORRUP, may contribute to an improvement in national environmental 
performance, as measured by ESI. The significant result for the coefficient on the 
measure of corruption provides empirical support for the theoretical result of López 




For the SYSW model we fail to reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients, 
except the intercept, are equal to zero. In the case where ESI, SYS and SYSW are the 
regressands, all the RESET tests indicate that we reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of three alternative specifications of the model are equal to zero, which 
suggests possible model misspecification.  
 
For the ESI and SO2 models, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test for 
homoskedasticity indicates, at the five percent level of significance, that a 
heteroskedastic error structure may be a problem. If heteroskedasticity does exist, the 
statistical tests of significance will be invalid. However, re-estimating the three 
models with White’s correction for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity gives 
similar levels of significance to those given in Table 6. In the re-estimated ESI model, 
the DEMO coefficient is not statistically different from zero, but the CORRUP 
coefficient becomes significant at the five percent level. In the SO2 model, there is 




In summary, the results do not indicate a broad-based relationship between public 
social capital and national environmental performance. However, the coefficient for 
DEMO is significant where SO2 is the regressand, and the coefficient for CORRUP is 




The correlations between social divergence variables and auxiliary regressions are 
provided in Table 7. The correlations do not indicate a problem of collinear 
relationships among the explanatory variables and this is supported with the low R-
squared in the auxiliary regressions.  
  12 
Table 8 provides the results of the regressions with the social divergence regressors. 
None of the three coefficients for the proxies for social divergence are significantly 
different from zero at the ten percent level in any of the regressions. To test the 
influence of the choice of the regressors on the results, the models were re-estimated 
using alternative proxies of social divergence from the ICRG, while controlling for 
population density and per capita income. These alternative social divergence 
measures include a six-point measure of religious tensions and a six-point measure of 
ethnic tensions for June 1999.  The coefficient for the measure of religious tension is 
significantly different from zero at the ten percent level in the ESI and SO2 models, 
but has the opposite to expected sign in the SO2 model. The coefficient of the proxy 
for ethnic tension is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level in only 
the SO2 model, but has the opposite sign to that expected.
10 
 
Overall, the results provide little evidence that the chosen measures of social 




The sample correlations and auxiliary regressions between the explanatory variables 
are given in Table 9. The results of the regressions that model the effect of social 
capacity on national environmental performance are provided in Table 10. The AYS 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero in any of the models, but the CAL 
coefficient is significant where ESI, SYS, SYSA and SYSW are the regressands. In 
all these four models, an increase in calorie intake reduces measures of national 
environmental performance. However, only in the SYSA model do we reject the null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients in alternative specifications of the model are all 
equal to zero, but in this case we reject the null hypothesis that the errors are normally 
distributed. For the SO2 model, the BPG statistic indicates the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity. Using White’s correction for an unknown form of heteroskedastic 
variances the AYS coefficient remains insignificant.
11  
 
Overall, the results provide evidence that increases in calorie intake may significantly 
influence broad measures of environmental performance as proxied by ESI, SYS, 
SYSA and SYSW. In all four models, however, the sign of the coefficient is negative, 
  13rather than the expected positive sign, suggesting that the collinear relationship 
(0.605) between CAL and GDPPC may be contributing to a scale effect that would 
tend to reduce national environmental performance. Further investigation using 
alternative measures of social capacity is required before any firm conclusion can be 
drawn as to the effect of social capacity on environmental performance.   
 
Per Capita Income and Population Density 
 
Measures of per capita income and population density are control variables that are 
expected to affect national measures of environmental performance.
12 The intention is 
not to focus on the impacts that the control variables have on environmental quality 
that has been addressed in many different studies (especially per capita income), but 
to control for their effects so as to assess the influence of social determinants on 
environmental performance.  
 
Selden and Song (1994) have shown that emissions per capita are decreasing as a 
function of population density although total emissions may rise with population 
density. Scruggs (1998) has hypothesized that higher density can reduce 
environmental degradation as it accentuates its impacts and provides an impetus to 
address problems of pollution. An alternative perspective, consistent with Selden and 
Song’s results, is that higher density may be associated with a reduced assimilative 
environmental capacity and, thus, poorer ambient measures of environmental 
performance. The results support the latter hypothesis and indicate that the POP 
coefficient is statistically different from zero with a negative sign in the ESI, SYS and 
SYSW models for all four different sets of explanatory variables.  
 
The results presented in Tables 4, 6, 8 and 10 show that the GDPPC coefficient is 
significantly different from zero and positive in the ESI and SYSA models for all four 
sets of explanatory variables. The GDPPC coefficient is also significantly different 
from zero and negative in all four TSP models and three of out of four of the SO2 
models.  These findings, however, should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
countries can grow out of their environmental problems as detailed testing of the 
relationship between per capita income and environmental performance is best 
accomplished using time series or panel data. Moreover, our study is not intended to 
  14be a detailed analysis of the existence, or otherwise, of an EKC, but an examination of 
the effects of social determinants on environmental performance.
13  
 
6.  Social Capital and Policy Issues 
 
The results provide only weak support that the chosen national measures of civic 
social capital, social divergence and social capacity positively affect national 
measures of environmental quality. The implications of the results are reviewed 
below. 
 
Civic versus Public Social Capital 
 
The results suggest that the impact of social capital on national environmental 
performance is likely to be more important in terms of its effects at the public or 
institutional level, rather than in terms of its effect at the civic or individual level. This 
interpretation is supported, in part, by evidence that the only social determinants that 
have a positive effect on national environmental performance---democracy with urban 
concentrations of sulphur dioxides
14 and corruption with an overall environmental 
sustainability---are measures of public social capital. This effect may also be 
accentuated at higher levels of income given the positive correlations between 
GDPPC and the measures of public social capital. If this is the case, it may imply a 
“middle-class consensus” (Easterly 2001) whereby improved institutions complement 
increases in per capita income to accentuate any positive effects on environmental 
quality. Such a result is also consistent with a mean voter explanation for why income 
inequality and pollution may be positively related in a complete democracy (Eriksson 
and Persson 2003). 
 
The Structure of Social Capital 
 
The extent to which aggregate measures of social capital, social divergence and social 
capacity play a role in determining national environmental performance is also likely 
to be dependent on how  societies are structured. For instance, Putnam (2000) 
distinguishes between bridging social capital that links across groups and aids 
information diffusion, and bonding social capital that helps to reinforce existing and 
  15more exclusive identities and groupings. Thus if measures of social capital, such as 
association membership, reflect merely bonding social capital this may not necessarily 
have any positive impact on the national levels of environmental performance.  
 
The Use of Social Capital 
 
The importance of social capital may also be related to how it is used. For example, 
Ostrom (2000, p. 198) emphasizes that the benefits that accrue from social capital at a 
local level arise from self-organized resource governance systems. In other words, 
social capital directed towards stewardship (Carr, 2002) may be more important in 
affecting environmental performance than social capital directed toward advocacy.
15 
Further, evidence that social capital may improve environmental performance at the 
local level does not necessarily imply that the federation of such networks on a 
national level (Pretty and Ward, 2001) will be successful, or that the requirements for 
effective collective action will exist at a national level.
16 
 
Another issue of importance is that many aspects of social capital do not directly 
focus on the improvement of national environmental performance. Thus a country 
might, for example, be characterized by a high-level of trust and church attendance, 
but this may not translate itself into a better state of the environment. Indeed, given 
the time constraints on all individuals, the greater the time spent in one particular set 
of activities or networks the less time, ceteris paribus, that can be devoted to 
competing activities. Moreover, an increase in membership of social organisations 
that focus on the environment does not necessarily imply a rise in civic engagement 
focused on the environment (Putnam, 2000 p. 53).  
 
Economic and Demographic Factors 
 
A possible explanation for the lack of a significant relationship between aggregate 
measures of civic social capital, social divergence and social capacity and national 
environmental performance is that environmental quality (or degradation) is 
dominated by economic and demographic factors. Such a finding is consistent with 
the results of several authors. In particular, Xepapadeas and Amri (1998) find that the 
probability of having acceptable environmental quality changes with the level of 
  16economic development. It would seem, therefore, that population density and factors 
associated with per capita income, such as input intensities and emissions per unit of 
output and per unit of input, may account for much of the variation in national 




Overall, the study finds that factors other than social determinants play an important 
role in explaining environmental quality. An implication, supported by the work of 
Bruvoll and Medin (2003), is that technical factors represented by emissions 
intensities and input intensities are dominant factors that affect environmental 
degradation. If correct, this suggests that policies directed to reducing emissions and 
input intensities and technical innovation are critical instruments in environmental 
policy. 
 
The pivotal role of technical innovation in determining national environmental 
performance does not necessarily imply that social factors have no role to play in 
reducing environmental degradation. Based on our findings, which support the 
existing theory (López and Mitra 2000; Eriksson and Persson 2003), it would seem 
that the primary importance of social determinants on the environment is in terms of 
the level of corruption and democratic accountability. 
 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Using cross-sectional data from a sample of low, middle and high-income countries, 
the paper provides the first empirical test as to whether a range of national measures 
of civic and public social capital, social divergence and social capacity influence 
national environmental performance. The findings suggest that, with the exception of 
measures of corruption and democracy, higher levels of social capital and related 
variables are not necessarily associated with better levels of national environmental 
performance.  
 
The results imply that the mere existence of social capital is not a sufficient condition 
for improved national environmental outcomes. This may be because it is the type of 
  17social capital, how it is applied and whether it is directed to environmental 
stewardship that determines its overall effect on national environmental performance. 
The policy implications from our study are that improved national environmental 
performance may be best accomplished by focusing policy efforts at reducing 
emission and input intensities, and by raising the overall quality of public 
administration and democratic accountability.
  18Table 1. Summary Statistics of the 53 Country Sample Data 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean  SD  Max. No. of Obs.  Source    Period       Impact 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Environmental Performance 
ESI   55.883  11.967   52   GLTETF 2001   + 
SYS   53.475  17.554   52   GLTETF 2001   + 
SYSA   0.209  0.831   52   GLTETF 2001   + 
SYSW   0.103  0.761   52   GLTETF 2001   + 
SO2   28.383 27.398   36    GLTETF 1990-1996  - 
TSP   87.220 79.333   34    GLTETF 1990-1996  - 
Social Capital (civic) 
TRUST   26.467 13.879   42    Inglehart  et al. 1995-1997  + 
CIVIC   38.676  2.628   38   Inglehart  et al. 1995-1997  + 
ASSOC   0.462 0.335   38    Inglehart  et al. 1995-1997  + 
Social Capital (public) 
DEMO   4.679  1.341   53   Sealy   June  1999  + 
CORRUP  3.491  1.409   53   Sealy   June  1999  + 
Social Divergence 
ELF   30.526  28.472   38   Mauro   1960   + 
LANDIN  57.828 16.257   32    Jazairy  et al. 1980-1985  + 
RELHOM  0.769  0.206   38   Barrett   1980   - 
Social Capacity 
CAL   119.92  18.181   39   GLTETF 1988-90   + 
AYS   8.058  2.396   48   Barro  &  Lee  2000   + 
Controls 
GDPPC   12105  8827   52   World  Bank  1998   NA 
POP   130.69  163.38   51   World  Bank  1998   NA 
Notes: 
1.  Impact = +(-) indicates a positive (negative) relationship between an increase in the particular variable and its influence on 
its group category provided under the headings environmental performance, social capital (civic), social capital (public), 
social divergence and social capacity.  
2.  GLTETF = Global Leaders of Tomorrow Environment Task Force. 
3.  ESI and SYS are component scores given as a standard normal percentile and range from a theoretical low of 0 to a high of 
100 and are calculated for 2001 using data from earlier periods. ESI is a composite measure of environmental sustainability 
based on 22 separate environmental indicators. SYS is a composite measure based on indicators of air quality, water 
quantity, water quality, biodiversity and terrestrial systems 
4.  SYSA and SYSW are given as Z scores with a zero indicating the mean for the 122 countries in the GLTETF and a value of 
+1 (-1) representing one standard deviation above or below the mean. Values are calculated for 2001 using data from earlier 
periods. SYSA is an indicator based on measures of urban SO2, NO2 and TSP concentrations. SYSW is an indicator based 
on measures of dissolved oxygen, phosphorous concentration, suspended solids and electrical conductivity. 
5.  SO2 is urban concentration of sulphur dioxide in thousands of metric tons and TSP is urban total suspended particulate 
concentration in thousands of metric tons as given in Annex 6 of the GLTETF. Within each country the values were 
normalized by city population for the year 1995 and summed across cities to obtain a total country concentration. 
6.  CAL is daily per calorie intake as a percentage of total requirements as given in Annex 6 of the GLTETF. 
  19Table 2. Simple Correlations between the Measures of Environmental 
Performance 
 
Variable    ESI  SYS SYSA  SYSW  SO2 TSP 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ESI     1  0.878 0.710 0.388 -0.631  -0.711 
 
SYS     1  0.700 0.671 -0.493  -0.726 
 
S Y S A       1 0.165  -0.729  -0.812 
 
S Y S W        1 -0.042  -0.252 
 
S O 2         1 0.536 
 
T S P          1 
 
Notes: 
1. The sample correlation coefficients were calculated using 30 observations, which represent the total 
number of countries with observations for all 6 variables. 
  20Table 3. Simple Correlations between the Measures of Civic Social Capital and 
R
2 of Auxiliary Regressions 
 




TRUST     1  0.356   0.056   0.670   -0.018  0.501 
 
CIVIC     1   0.414   0.398   0.319  0.407 
 
A S S O C        1   0.307   0.026  0.257 
 
G D P P C          1   -0.172  0.567 
 






1.  The correlation coefficients were calculated using 35 observations, which represent the total 
number of countries with observations for all 5 variables. 
2.  Each auxiliary regression has the identified explanatory variable as the regressand and all other 
explanatory variables as the regressors. The R
2 from each auxiliary regression is provided in the 
column Aux. R
2. 
  21Table 4. Estimates of the Effects of Civic Social Capital on Environmental 
Performance 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    ESI  SYS SYSA  SYSW  SO2 TSP 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
TRUST     .056E-3  -0.189 -0.27E-2  -0.016 -0.021 2.026
a 
      (0.052)  (-0.776) (-0.209) (-1.234) (-0.040) (1.915) 
 
CIVIC      0.584 1.711 0.040 0.103 -2.846  2.176 
      (1.142) (1.483) (0.658) (1.698) (-1.097)  (0.442) 
 
ASSOC    -7.991
b -12.481 -0.734
a -0.436  6.823  128.42
c 
      (-2.251) (-1.557) (-1.739) (-1.037) (0.339)  (2.877) 
 
GDPPC    0.001
c 0.001
b 0.64E-4
c -0.49E-5 -0.13E-2 -0.11E-2
c 
   (6.071)  (2.512)  (2.821)  (-0.219)  (-1.248)  (-5.268) 
 
POP    -0.019
b -0.039
b 0.36E-3  -0.21E-2
b-0.017 0.282
b 
      (-2.721) (-2.544) (0.443)  (-2.594) (-0.323) (2.758) 
 
CONSTANT    27.210 -7.464 -1.612 -2.822 154.18 8.621 
   (1.504)  (-0.183)  (-0.749)  (-1.315)  (1.631)  (0.049) 
 
Adj. R
2     0.744 0.349 0.267 0.113 0.150 0.641  
 
No. Obs.    35 35 35 35 21 21 
 









RESET(2)[1,n-k-1 df]  0.054 5.971*  1.840 21.096*  2.156 0.14E-5 
RESET(3)[2,n-k-2 df]  2.509 7.714*  2.099 10.519*  1.271 2.033 




Jarque-Bera stat. [2 df]  1.443 1.559 35.90*  0.817 3.540 0.005 
 
Notes: 
1.  k= number of regressors, n= number of observations and df=degrees of freedom. 
2.  T-ratios are given in brackets. The estimated coefficients from a two-tailed t-test that are 




3.  Test statistics that indicate we should reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level of 
significance are denoted by  *.  
4.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the regressors, except the 
constant term, are equal to zero. 
5.  The BPG test statistic is for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and converges to a chi-square 
distribution if the null is true. 
6.  The RESET tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors in alternative 
model specifications are all zero and has an F distribution if the null is true. The alternative models 
have the same regressand, but included in the regressors is the regressand squared (2), squared and 
cubed (3), squared, cubed and to the power of 4 (4). 
7.   The Jarque-Bera test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the errors are normally distributed and 
converges to a chi-square distribution if the null is true. 
8.   E-i denotes that the coefficient is multiplied by 10
-i. 
  22Table 5. Simple Correlations between the Measures of Public Social Capital and 
R
2 of Auxiliary Regressions 
 




DEMO     1   0.639   0.636   0.1667  0.544 
 
CORRUP     1   0.612   -0.047  0.491 
 
G D P P C          1 -0.033  0.484 
 




1.  The correlation coefficients were calculated using 51 observations, which represent the total 
number of countries with observations for all 4 variables. 
2.  Each auxiliary regression has the identified explanatory variable as the regressand and all other 
explanatory variables as the regressors. The R




  23Table 6. Estimates of Effects of Public Social Capital on Environmental 
Performance 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    ESI  SYS SYSA  SYSW  SO2 TSP 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
DEMO     0.396 -0.580  0.090 -0.031  -8.064
b 1.410 
   (0.392)  (-0.259)  (0.820)  (-0.277)  (-2.047)  (0.110) 
 
CORRUP   1.842
a  1.576 0.110 0.024 -3.182  -1.106   
      (1.996) (0.772) (1.096) (0.233) (-0.973)  (-0.093) 
 






   (5.688)  (2.435)  (2.002)  (-0.328)  (-2.276)  (-3.570) 
 
POP    -0.023
c -0.041
c -0.15E-3  -0.18E-2
b 0.017  0.145 
      (-3.943) (-3.155) (-0.235) (-2.692) (0.634)  (1.636) 
 
CONSTANT   40.63
c 46.223
c -0.961
b 0.446  96.942
c 155.65
c 
   (11.58)  (5.956)  (-2.523)  (1.13)  (6.768)  (3.803) 
 
Adj. R
2     0.708 0.319 0.281 0.085 0.495 0.377  
 
No. Obs.    51 51 51 51 35 33 
 








RESET(2)[1,n-k-1 df]  6.285*  13.639* 0.553  25.757* 5.554*  5.183* 
RESET(3)[2,n-k-2 df]  7.335* 7.370* 0.367  19.108*  2.683  3.089 








1.  k= number of regressors, n= number of observations and df=degrees of freedom. 
2.  T-ratios are in brackets. Estimated coefficients from a two-tailed t-test that are significant at 10 or 




3.  Test statistics that indicate we should reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level of 
significance are denoted by *.   
4.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the regressors, except the 
constant term, are equal to zero. 
5.  The BPG test statistic is for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and converges to a chi-square 
distribution if the null is true. 
6.  The RESET tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors in alternative 
model specifications are all zero and has an F distribution if the null is true. The alternative models 
have the same regressand, but included in the regressors is the regressand squared (2), squared and 
cubed (3), squared, cubed and to the power of 4 (4). 
7.  The Jarque-Bera test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the errors are normally distributed and 
converges to a chi-square distribution if the null is true. 




  24Table 7. Simple Correlations between the Measures of Social Divergence and R
2 
of Auxiliary Regressions 
 




ELF   1   -0.154   -0.138   -0.299   0.039  0.130 
 
LANDIN     1   0.245   -0.105   -0.283  0.137 
 
RELHOM      1   0.077   -0.425  0.215 
 
G D P P C          1   0.055  0.220 
 




1.  The correlation coefficients were calculated using 31 observations, which represent the total 
number of countries with observations for all 5 variables. 
2.  Each auxiliary regression has the identified explanatory variable as the regressand and all other 
explanatory variables as the regressors. The R




  25Table 8. Estimates of Effects of Social Divergence on Environmental 
Performance 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    ESI  SYS SYSA  SYSW  SO2 TSP 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
ELF      -0.061 -0.093 0.26E-2  -0.28E-2  -0.110 0.754 
      (-1.256) (-0.999) (0.542)  (-0.545) (-0.735) (1.622) 
 
LANDIN    -0.067 -0.136 -0.16E-2  0.22E-2  -0.071 -0.118 
      (-0.796) (-0.854) (-0.192) (0.250)  (-0.304) (-0.157) 
 
RELHOM    -1.910 -15.609    -0.226  0.020  -0.016 43.599 
      (-0.267) (-1.152) (-0.326) (-0.026) (-0.001) (0.622) 
 






   (7.060)  (3.041)  (4.022)  (-0.758)  (-4.289)  (-3.497)   
 
POP    -0.045
c -0.100
c -0.98E-3  -0.40E-2
c-0.40E-20.125 
      (-4.173) (-4.908) (-0.938) (-3.490) (-0.119) (1.261) 
 
CONSTANT   55.451
c 78.757
c -0.310  0.777  68.774
b 100.17 
   (6.485)  (4.866)  (-0.373)  (0.852)  (2.273)  (1.223) 
 
Adj. R
2     0.718 0.512 0.296 0.298 0.366 0.452 
 
No. Obs.    31 31 31 31 25 23 
 








RESET(2)[1,n-k-1 df] 0.011 0.518 0.126 28.217*  5.528*  1.332 
RESET(3)[2,n-k-2 df] 1.092 0.328 2.185 13.862*  2.718 0.795 




Jarque-Bera stat.[2 df]  0.598 0.028 69.472*  1.806 1.717 13.264* 
 
Notes: 
1.  k= number of regressors, n= number of observations and df=degrees of freedom. 
2.  T-ratios are in brackets. Estimated coefficients from a two-tailed t-test that are significant at 10 or 




3.  Test statistics that indicate we should reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level of 
significance are denoted by *.   
4.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the regressors, except the 
constant term, are equal to zero. 
5.  The BPG test statistic is for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and converges to a chi-square 
distribution if the null is true. 
6.  The RESET tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors in alternative 
model specifications are all zero and has an F distribution if the null is true. The alternative models 
have the same regressand, but included in the regressors is the regressand squared (2), squared and 
cubed (3), squared, cubed and to the power of 4 (4). 
7.  The Jarque-Bera test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the errors are normally distributed and 
converges to a chi-square distribution if the null is true. 
8.  E-i denotes that the coefficient is multiplied by 10
-i. 








CAL     1  0.490   0.605   -0.204   0.382 
 
AYS     1   0.779   -0.255   0.632 
 
G D P P C        1   -0.127   0.682 
 




1. The correlation coefficients were calculated using 38 observations, which represent the total number 
of countries with observations for all 4 variables. 
2. Each auxiliary regression has the identified explanatory variable as the regressand and all other 
explanatory variables as the regressors. The R
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Table 10. Estimates of the Effects of Social Capacity on Environmental 
Performance 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    ESI  SYS SYSA  SYSW  SO2 TSP 
______________________________________________________________________________ 




b 0.258  0.821 
      (-3.866) (-4.929) (-2.526) (-2.697) (0.959)  (0.904) 
 
AYS      -0.160 -1.112 -0.086 -0.23E-2  -0.184 7.630
 
      (-0.257) (-0.868) (-1.177) (-0.029) (-0.080) (0.988) 
 






      (7.080) (5.079) (4.601) (0.688) (-3.501)  (-4.048)   
 
POP    -0.026
c -0.050
c -0.18E-3  -0.21E-2
c0.012 0.118 
      (-4.555) (-4.319) (-0.272) (-3.012) (0.462)  (1.341) 
 




c 31.868  55.855
 
      (9.038) (7.373) (1.96)  (2.880) (0.879) (0.493) 
 
Adj. R
2     0.771 0.598 0.417 0.226 0.421 0.486 
 
No. Obs.    38 38 38 38 31 27 
 








RESET(2)[1,n-k-1 df] 3.002 4.742*  1.806 17.566  2.563 4.524* 
RESET(3)[2,n-k-2 df]  10.550*  3.500* 0.942  9.485* 1.615  2.154 




Jarque-Bera stat.[2 df]  0.990 0.659 12.077*  2.749 0.895 1.788 
 
Notes: 
1.  k= number of regressors, n= number of observations and df=degrees of freedom. 
2.  T-ratios are in brackets. Estimated coefficients from a two-tailed t-test that are significant at 10 or 




3.  Test statistics that indicate we should reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level of 
significance are denoted by *.  
4.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the regressors, except the 
constant term, are equal to zero. 
5.  The BPG test statistic is for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and converges to a chi-square 
distribution if the null is true. 
6.  The RESET tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors in alternative 
model specifications are all zero and has an F distribution if the null is true. The alternative models 
have the same regressand, but included in the regressors is the regressand squared (2), squared and 
cubed (3), squared, cubed and to the power of 4 (4). 
7.  The Jarque-Bera test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the errors are normally distributed and 
converges to a chi-square distribution if the null is true. 
8.  E-i denotes that the coefficient is multiplied by 10
-i. 
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  32End Notes 
                                                           
1 A full data appendix that gives all observations per country is available upon request. The 53 nations 
in the sample include: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
2 Several other similar, but different, definitions of social capital also exist.  See the edited volume by 
Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) for alternative perspectives. 
3 For descriptions of various international environmental agreements consult Grafton, Pendleton and 
Nelson (2001). 
4  Further details about the variables are provided in Table 1. A detailed description of the indicators 
and data sources is given in GLTETF (2001) and the associated annexes. 
5 Measures of income inequality are problematic due to the limited number of countries for which data 
are available that are of “high quality”, “reliable” and comparable. See Knowles (2001) for further 
details. 
6 For a detailed discussion on social divergence and the variables used to measure it, consult Grafton, 
Knowles and Owen (2002). 
7 We view the average years of schooling (AYS) as a superior measure to a basic literacy rate. AYS 
provides a measure of degree of human capital that a measure of proportion of the population that are 
literate does not, and also provides a measure with a greater dispersion. 
8 A possibility exists that the errors in the six estimated equations might be correlated in that the error 
term in one equation for a particular observation or country may be correlated in another equation for 
the same country. In other words, the influence of omitted factors in one equation for a particular 
country may be similar to their influence in another of the six equations for the same country. 
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is an alternative estimation procedure to OLS that uses 
information on the correlation across error terms for the same observation or country to obtain more 
precise estimates. In our study all the explanatory variables are identical for every country and in every 
equation. In this situation, the SUR and OLS procedures will yield identical estimates of the 
coefficients, even if errors across equations are correlated. 
9 Several potential reasons exist for the result that reduced corruption can improve national 
environmental performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 615) observe "…countries would rather 
spend their limited resources on infrastructure projects and defence, where corruption opportunities are 
abundant, than on education and health, where there are much more limited." López and Mitra (2000) 
emphasize that bribery and rent-seeking behaviour may prevent the implementation or enforcement of 
pollution control measures. 
10  These results are available on request from the authors. 
11 Torras and Boyce (1998) find that increased literacy in low-income countries improved a number of 
ambient air and water quality measures. However, for high-income countries they find contradictory 
results with literacy improving measures of heavy particles and dissolved oxygen, but increasing 
ambient measures of smoke and faecal coliform (see their Table 3, p. 156). 
12 Results with GDP
2 as a regressor and also separate regressions with the data split between low and 
high-income countries are available on request from the authors. The inclusion of the additional 
explanatory variable does not change the overall findings provided in Tables 4, 6, 8 and 10. 
13 See de Bruyn, Dasgupta et al. (2002), Harbaugh et al. (2002) and Stern (1998) for examinations of 
the empirical evidence for an environmental Kuznets curve. 
14 This result is also consistent with the findings of Harbaugh et al. (2002). 
15  Pretty and Ward (2001, p. 213) also emphasize the importance of distinguishing between social 
capital embedded in social and church groups and social capital embodied in groups focused on natural 
resources. 
16 Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994, p. 328) observe, “Efforts to establish one set of rules to cover 
large territories, which include significantly different types of local environments, are as problematic as 
the presumption that those involved may find adequate solutions entirely on their own.”  
  33